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I.

Introduction

"Data is the lifeblood of the modern global economy. Digital trade and
cross-border data flows are expected to continue to grow faster than the
overall rate of global trade. Businesses use data to create value and many can
only maximize that value when data can flow freely across borders."'
China's highest legislative body issued its first cybersecurity law on
November 7, 2016, which became effective nationwide on June 1, 2017
("Cybersecurity Law").2 Commentators opine that "businesses operating in
China should [pay significant attention to the Cybersecurity Law] because it
contains several provisions that could greatly impact their information
security practices and liabilities."3
To date, the Chinese governments have issued several implementation
rules to provide more detailed guidance on the general requirements set out
in the Cybersecurity Law.4 Some of these implementation rules are in draft
forms issued for public comments. 5 Certain draft industry standards, once
officially adopted, are voluntary only (meaning enterprises can choose
whether to comply with such standards or not).6 However, this article still
considers such voluntary standards because they provide detailed
instructions to the general mandatory obligations.: These voluntary
standards may also serve as safe harbor in reality during governmental
enforcement actions8
1. Global Digital Trade I: Market Opportunities and Key Foreign Trade Restrictions, Inv.
No. 332 - 561, USITC Pub. 4716 (Aug., 2017).
2. Ron Cheng, China Passes Long-Awaited Cyber Security Law, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2016, 7:07
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/roncheng/2016/11/09/china-passes-long-awaited-cybersecurity-law/#572c013f24d2.
3. Drew Foerster, China's Legislature Gears Up to Pass a Sweepingly Vague Cybersecurity Law,
BUSINESS LAW TODAY (May 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/05/
02_foerster.html.
4. Tod Liao and Judy Wang, China's Cybersecurity Law and Draft Implementation Rules,
MORGAN LEWIS, (May 25, 2017), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/chinas-cybersecuritylaw-and-draft-implementation-rules.
5. Id. para. 2.
6. Id. para. 24.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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A spokesman of the Cyberspace Administration of China ("CAC") also
held press conference on June 1, 2017 to respond to enterprise concerns and
public questions on the Cybersecurity Law ("June 2017 Press Conference").9
Comparing with the usual timeline that China passes its new laws,
Chinese governments acted quickly in passing the new regime,1o showing
China's determination in regulating its cyberspace.
Before issuance of the Cybersecurity Law, China already has an existing
legal regime governing its cyberspace.11 However, such existing legal regime
is generally regarded as relying only on lower-level legislation, piecemeal
and not very well coordinated.12 The Cybersecurity Law is the first
systematic approach at the highest legislative level for the Chinese
governments to regulate its cyberspace.13 While enhancing protection set
out under the existing legal regime, the new cybersecurity legal regime
introduced new requirements (to be discussed below).'4
As a road map, Section 2 of this article outlines the basic framework of the
new cybersecurity legal regime. Sections 3-5 respectively analyses the
following "controversial" requirements introduced under the new regime
and their impact on foreign investments in China: (1) data localization and
cross-border transfer restrictions, (2) restrictions for network operators to
collect and use personal data in China, and (3) PRC national cybersecurity
review. Section 6 summarizes generally legal penalties for any violation of
each of such obligations for completeness. Section 7 concludes with overall
suggestions to foreign investors and legal advisors for evaluating investment
in China.
Where applicable, this article compares the new Chinese cybersecurity
legal regime against the relevant legal regime of the United States ("US"). I
have particularly selected the US legal regime for comparison because the
US appears to be the "toughest" contester against the Cybersecurity Law.5
Also, the US legal regime is one of the legal frameworks that the Chinese

A &, Winglu6 anquin fi jiadii:
9. Xiang Hang, M 9 5A i :
Kriiqi w6gu6 xinxi winglu6 lfa jincheng [Interpretation of Cyber Security Law: Opening the
Legislative Process of China's Information Network], NPC, (Nov. 10, 2016 2:38 PM), http://
www.npc.gov.cn/npc/lfzt/rlyw/2016-11/10/content_2002309.htm.
10. See China's Cybersecurity Law six months on: enforcement begins but implementation ongoing, DE
BRALUw BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK, (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.debrauw.com/newsletter/
chinas-cybersecurity-law-six-months-enforcement-started-implementation-ongoing/.
11. Chen Jihong, Interpreting "The Law of Cyber Security": A Perspective of Eight Perspectives,
LEXIS CHINA, (Nov. 15, 2016), http://hk.lexiscn.com/law/prof-articles-content.php?articleid=
205818&lang=en.
12. See China's Cybersecurity Law, supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. See generally id.
15. Ling Ping, Danyou Maoyi Meiguo Yaoqiu Zhongguo Tingzhi Shishi Wangluoanquan Fa
(@rt

i Af

HVq)

[Concern on Trading, the US urges China to stop

enforcing the Cybersecurity Law], RADIO FREE AsIA (Sep. 26, 2017), http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/
yataibaodao/jingmao/yl-09262017111629.html (discussing US has submitted reports to WTO
stating that China should stop enforcing the Cybersecurity Law).
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governments mentioned to have studied in particular before issuing the new
Chinese regime.16 This article also slightly discusses the legal regime of
other countries/regions such as the European Union ("EU") to provide
additional international context.
II.

Overview on the Latest Chinese Cybersecurity Legal Regime

According to the CAC spokesman, the Cybersecurity Law is primarily
enacted to protect national cybersecurity and the legal interests of
enterprises and Chinese citizens.17 In responding to concerns from foreign
enterprises, the spokesman responded that the law is not enacted to impede
foreign enterprises, technology or products from accessing the Chinese
market or to restrict legal cross-border data transfer.s
The underlying rationale of the Cybersecurity Law is to divide the
cyberspace into four parts and regulate each accordingly.19 These parts
include: (1) the critical information infrastructure ("CII"), as the basic
foundation, (2) above that, the intermediate Internet platforms (e.g., the ecommerce platforms), (3) further above, the Internet users, and (4) at the
very top, the cyber-data of the Internet users. 20 The Cybersecurity Law is
one of the foundational cyberspace legislation designated to regulate CII
operators and operators of other network facilities.21 The other
foundational legislation being deliberated is the Telecommunication Law of
the PRC whose goal is primarily to regulate data transmission issues.22
The Cybersecurity Law governs any individual or entity that "construct,
operate, maintain or use any 'network' within China and the overall
cybersecurity in China".23 The definition of "network" and "network
operators" are drafted broadly, and can cover telecommunication service
providers such as Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent,24 and potentially all businesses
operating in China since nearly all businesses administer computer networks
(a type of captured network) at least for internal use. 2 5
"Network operators" are further divided into the CII operator and other
network operators with the CII operators subject to enhanced security

(

16. See e.g. Xinxi Anquan Jishu Guanjian Xinxi Jichu Sheshi Anquan Jiancha Pinggu Zhinan

Zhengqiuyijian Bianzhi Shuoming

8,1Ji#)

[National Standards "Information Security Technology Key
R_ Kfirju
Information Infrastructure Security Inspection Evaluation Guide" Preparation Instructions]
(July 2017).
17. See Hang, supra note 9.
18. Id.
19. See China's Cybersecuity Law six months on, supra note 10.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Wiinglu6
fa (
P,±f) [Cybersecurity Law] (promulgated by Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Nov. 7, 2016, effective Jun. 1, 2017) (Lawinfochina).
24. See China's Cybersecurity Law, supra note 10.
25. See Foerster, supra note 3, at 2.

Enquan
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requirements.26 Other network operators are voluntary to comply with such

'

enhanced requirements.27
The Cybersecurity Law defines CII by two conjunctive parameters: any
damage to or data leakage of a CII needs to possibly cause seriously harm to
China's national security (impact parameter), and (2) such infrastructure is
utilized within certain key industries designated by the Chinese governments
(industry parameter).28 The PRC State Council has the authority to issue
and update specific scope of CII from time to time.29 Commentators have
criticized such non-exclusive approach to define CII as providing
"considerable leeway to bring industries not specifically singled out in the
definition into [regulation] at a later stage".30 However, it seems such
approach is not uncommon as the US adopts a similar approach for the
regulation of CII within its territory region, defining CII based on both the
industry and impact parameters and giving authority to the Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS") to update the regulated scope from time to
time. 3
Under published sources, CII in China is further narrowed down to any
infrastructure of "network facilities, information systems, and/or Internet
application systems" meeting the two parameters. 32 Further, a seemingly
internal governmental document provides additional guidance on CII
identification.33 For example, the document identifies CII as "information
systems or industry control systems" that can generally be classified into
three categories: (1) websites (e.g., news media), (2) platforms (e.g., ecommerce platforms), and (3) manufacturing and business facilities (e.g.,
cloud centers). This document also outlines additional quantitative
26. Dong Xiao, Kemeng Cai, and Jinghe Guo, Cyber Security Law Adopted by the NPC Standing
Committee, JUNHE (Nov. 16, 2016) http://www.junhe.com/law-reviews/18? locale=en.
27. See Winglu6 ainquin Fi, supra note 23, art. 31.
2 8. Id.
29. Id.
30. Gabriela Kennedy, Xiaoyan Zhang, China Passes Cybersecurity Law, MAYER BROWN JSM
(Nov. 10, 2016), para. 2, https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/3c8214cb-f3a4-42c8bcl7-bb2f27da9af3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/cla4fdf2-9d57-40bb-8a83-c5b5f8902
c82/161 1 10-HKGPRC-CybersecurityDataPrivacy-TMT.pdf.
31. Elgin M. Brunner and Manuel Suter, InternationalCIIP Handbook 2008 / 2009, CENTER
FOR SECURITY STUDIES, ETH ZURICH at 433 - 4, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/
special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CIIP-HB-08-09.pdf
[hereinafter
2008/2009 CIIP Handbook]; see also Zuo Xiaodong, Guanjian Xinxi Jichu Sheshi Bao!
((#@A~hMQ
,
!) [Protection of CII], http://www.cac.gov.cn/2015-11/04/c_111701
5673.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2017) (discussing the legislative history of CII in the US)
[hereinafter Zuo Xiaodong, CII Protection].
32. See, e.g., Gu6jia winglu6 kongjian inquin zhanie (ES'PR
19l
&)[National
Cyberspace Security Strategy] (promulgated by National Internet Information Office, Dec. 27,
2016, effective Dec. 27, 2016) InfoLawChina (China).
33. See, e.g., About developing key information infrastructure Network Security Check Notice,
Changchun City Health and Family Planning Commission (April 26, 2017 1:50 PM), http://
www.hfpccc.gov.cn/ghxxGzdt/2939.htm.
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parameters for identifying CII within each category and proposes specific
steps to identify CII.
Applying the guidelines set out above, many CII will be managed by
private enterprises. The CAC spokesman explained that this is also the case
in the US where around eighty-seven percent of CII are managed by private
enterprises.34
The Cybersecurity Law designates the CAC to be the authority
coordinating efforts among all the other Chinese governments in regulating
network operators. Other enforcement authorities include the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, other
industry regulators, and local governments.35 The US has a similar
regulatory structure where the DHS is the overall authority coordinating all
efforts among other federal and state governments in regulating CII.36
III.

Data Localization / Cross-Border Transfer Restrictions

Before issuance of the new regime, there are existing legal requirements
within specific industries (e.g., banking) on data localization and crossborder transfer restrictions.37 Such requirements are scattered in lower-level
legislation and are limited to application within the specific industries.38
The Cybersecurity Law took the approach to generally regulate data storage
and cross-border transfer nationwide.39
Under the Cybersecurity Law:
CII operators [1] should, store within China, any personal data [3] and
important data [4] they have collected and/or produced during their
operations in China [2]. If any CII operator needs to transfer [5] such
data overseas for business reasons, the applicable security assessment [6]
should be completed . 40

'

[1] Whose obligation? The Cybersecurity Law makes data localization
and cross-border transfer restrictions an obligation only for CII operators.4

Xinxi

See Brunner & Suter, supra note 31.
See id. at arts. 8, 32.
See id. at 434.
E.g., Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Guanyu Yinhangye Jinrong Jigou Zuohao Geren

Baohn

Jinrong

Gongzuo de Tongzhi
S)[Notice of the People's Bank of China on Urging Banking Financial
(

34.
35.
36.
37.

Chuanshu de

Qiye

Hegui Tiaozhan (BM

Af&)

)

Institutions to Do a Good Job in Protecting Personal Financial Information] (promulgated by
People's Bank of China, Jan. 21, 2011, effective May 1, 2011), art. 6.
38. See Jihong, supra note 11.
39. Jet (Zhisong) Deng and Ken (Jianmin) Dai, Wangluoanquan Fa Shidai Shuju Kuajing
[Compliance Challengesfor Enterprisesunder the Cross-BorderData Transfer Regime Introduced under
the Cybersecurity Law], MONDAQ, (Mar. 3, 207), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.
asp?articleid=573428.
40. See WANGLUO ANQUAN FA, supra note 23 art. 37.
41. Jihong, supra note 11.
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The CAC spokesman emphasized the same intention in the June 2017 Press
Conference. However, two subsequent draft implementation rules have
expanded such requirements to "any network operator."42 The actual
intention remains to be clarified.
[2] "Operations in China": The Cybersecurity Law left this concept
undefined. One draft implementation rule defines the concept as "doing
business or providing products or services in China" (regardless of an
entity's incorporation jurisdiction).43 Doing business in China can be
indicated through "using Chinese language in the business, using Renminbi
as the settlement currency, or delivering products into the Chinese
territory".4< The last factor of "delivering products into China" can indicate
the exterritorial effect of this rule.45
However, if an entity is only providing products or services to foreign
entities or foreign individuals and such business transaction does not involve
"personal data" of Chinese citizens or any "important data", such entity will
not be considered as operating in China.46
[3] "Personal data" refers to:
Any type of information, recorded in electronic or other forms, which
can be used, independently or in combination with other information,
to identify a natural person's personal identity, including a natural
person's name, date of birth, identity certificate number, biologyidentified personal data [e.g., iris, fingerprint], address, telephone
number, etc.47

To the extent any information has been technically processed so that
it no longer identifies a certain natural person (and such disconnection
is not recoverable), such information no longer qualifies as 'personal
42. See Geren Xinxi He Zhongyao Shuju Chujing Anquan Pinggu Banfa (Zhengqiuyijian Gao)
( A
l
AitFfftt&iEERAi)) [Information Security TechnologyGuidelines for Data Cross-Border Transfer Security Assessment] (issued by Cyberspace Admin.,
Apr. 11, 2017, allowed for public comments until May 11, 2017), art. 2; see also Xinxi Anquan
Jishu Shuju Chujing Anquan Pinggu Zhinan (
[Draft
Data Cross-Border Transfer Evaluation Guideline] (issued by Nat'l Info. Security
Standardization Tech. Comm. and Gen. Admin. of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine, Aug. 30, 2017, allowed for public comments until Oct. 13, 2017), art. 5; see also
Buzai Renxing (#tS
ief)
[Data Exit is no Longer Precarious] HanKun LLP (Apr. 13,
2017), at 1, https://www.hankunlaw.com/downloadfile/newsAndnsights/bl72b36397b6844f5
ede334b32ff6041.pdf.
43. See Information Security Technology Guidelines, art. 3.2, supra note 42.
44. Id.
45. Dong Xiao, Shuju Chujing Pinggu Zhinan Erci Zhengqiuyjian (REt
itAMl
ttEA) [Cross-Border Transfer Evaluation Guideline: second draft for comment] JUNHE
OFFICE (Sep. 14, 2017), http://www.junhe.com/law-reviews/686.

fE
LAW

46. See Information Security Technology Guidelines, art. 3.2, supra note 42.
47. See WANGLUO ANQUAN FA, supra note 23, art. 76-5; see also Information Security
Technology Guidelines, art. 3.3, supra note 42.
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transfer

Based on such definition, "personal data" includes information of "natural
person" only and not include information that identifies entities.
Originally, the draft version of the Cybersecurity Law limited the scope to
be "personal data of Chinese citizens" as opposed to the seemingly border
wording of any "personal data".49 Whether the intention of such wording
change is to extend protection to personal data of "foreign individuals"
remains to be clarified.
The carve-out for technically processed information is favorable for
enterprises to utilize data within the current big data era.
[4] "Important data": The Cybersecurity Law left this concept undefined.
One draft implementation rule defines it as:
Any data (including original data and derivative data) collected or
produced by entities and individuals in China that closely relates to
PRC national security, economic development, and public interest.
Any information that has been legally published through governmental
channels ceases to be recognized as 'important data'.50
In addition to such general definition, the draft rule also provides illustrative
examples of "important data" within twenty-seven industries (list not
intended to be exclusive and can be updated by applicable regulatory
authority from time to time).5' For example, "online e-commerce
transaction records" and "habits and inclination of individual customers" are
identified as "important data" within the e-commerce industry.52 "Technical
plan, computer software, source code, database, technical report, and testing
data" of a financial institution are identified as "important data" within the
financial industry53 Based on such broad identification, a large number of
corporate business data could potentially be considered as "important data"
and thus be subject to the restrictions.
[5] "Cross-border data transfer": The Cybersecurity Law left this concept
undefined. One draft implementation rule defines the concept broadly and
the key factors are whether any non-PRC party is accessing the data and the
location of such party when he/she reviews the data.54 As such, if a party
were to access the data stored in China in New York, this can qualify as a
transfer55 If a foreign national reviews data physically in China, this may
also qualify as a transfer. However, pure transmission of foreign data not
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See Information Security Technology Guidelines, art. B.1.4, supra note 42.
See Xiao, supra note 26, at 3.
See Information Security Technology Guidelines, art. 3.5, supra note 42.
Id. Exhibit A.
Id. Exhibit A 26-c.
Id. Exhibit A 19.1-b.
Id. art. 3.7
Nick Akerman, Joanna Levin, and David Ray, Fall 2016 Cross-BorderData PrivacyIssues, 25
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 379, 394 (2017).
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involving any local data produced as part of "operations in China" is carved
out from complying with the restrictions. In such case, China is being used
as a pure intermediary for processing or transmitting foreign data.56
[6] Security assessment: Security assessment is generally divided into selfevaluation or governmental evaluations To the extent that a governmental
evaluation is not triggered, an entity should conduct self-evaluation and file
the evaluation report with the applicable Chinese government."
Any security assessment is generally a two-step process. An entity first
assesses the "legality, rightfulness and necessity" for the cross-border data
transfer.59 Once a transfer is concluded as legal, rightful and necessary, a
second step is to assess the overall security risk for the transfer.60 There are
specific parameters as to how evaluation should be conducted during each
step.

Based on the outlined parameters, there are four possible evaluation
results - transfer risk identified as either low, medium, high or extremely
high. An entity is allowed to proceed with the cross-border data transfer if
the transfer risk is identified as low or medium. However, if the evaluation
result is either high or extremely high, the transfer is prohibited.61 An entity
is allowed to take on additional risk mitigation methods (e.g., reduce the
amount of data to be exported) to lower the risk and conduct re-evaluation.62
If there is any material change to the evaluated information (change to data
recipient presumed material) after completion of a transfer, an entity should
complete security assessment again via the same process.63
[7] Other considerations:
(a) Consents by an individual to transfer his/her "personal data": There is
some ambiguity as to whether an individual's consent can exempt an entity
entirely from security assessment, or if consent will only establish legality of
the transfer, and other parameters of a security assessment should still be
evaluated. The CAC spokesman seems to support the former,64 while a draft
implementation rule appears to take the latter approach.65
In any event, an entity must generally obtain consent from the applicable
individuals before transferring his/her "personal data". Consent must be
expressly given (e.g., through an online opt-in mechanism) or implied
through active behaviors (e.g., an individual voluntarily initiates crossborder online shopping disclosing his/her personal data).66 Before obtaining
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. art. 3.7.
See Information Security Technology Guidelines, arts. 7, 9, supra note 42.
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 5.1.
Id. arts. 4.2.1, 4.3.1.
Id. art 4.2.5.
Id. arts. 4.2.5, 4.2.7.
See Information Security Technology Guidelines, art. 12, supra note 42.
See Hang, supra note 9.
See Information Security Technology Guidelines, art. 5.1a, supra note 42.
Id. art. 3.2.
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consent, the entity transferring the data should inform the individual of
certain important information that a data subject should know for giving the
consent (e.g., the data recipient).67 Any material change to such information
warrants a new consent from the relevant individuals (change to recipients of
the data presumed material).68
(b) International agreements entered into by China on cross-border data
transfer: a draft implementation rule provides a potential outlet for
complying with the security assessment regime. That is, any specific crossborder data transfer arrangement entered into by China with international
organizations or foreign countries may preempt requirements under the
Cybersecurity Law.69 To date, I am not aware of any special international
agreements China has entered into in such respect. A CAC representative
has expressed that this outlet might be a future channel to initiate
international dialog or bargain on the cross-border data transfer issues.70
General comments: Requesting data localization and imposing cross-border
transfer restrictions is not uncommon internationally. Starting from
legislation in the EU, more than sixty-nine nations internationally have
enacted such restrictions, including Canada, Australia, etc.7' Further,
commentators opine that regulations on data localization and cross-border
transfer are legitimate under the VTO GATS rules due to the "general
exception" thereunder permitting member countries to adopt legislation
"protecting personal privacy in data processing and dissemination and
confidentiality of personal records and accounts."72
But any overly restricted cross-border data transfer requirements could
harm the interests of business enterprises and eventually harm the enacting
nation by isolating such nation from the rest of the world.73 As such,
scholars in China have emphasized the need to balance data protection and
business needs of global enterprises.74 Fortunately, major market players in
China such as Alibaba and Tencent have been involved in designing the
cross-border data transfer guidelines and hopefully will make their voice
heard during the legislative process.
In comparison, US companies (such as IBM) have long been recognized as
possessing the highest capability in processing data within a cross-border
context and have significantly benefited from the international flow of
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. art. 5.1.
Id.
Id. art 15.
Wu Shengkuo,

Wangluoanquan Fa: Xuyao de Zhichi Yu Dailai de Gaibian
5SR ) [Cybersecurity Law: Needed Support and Potential
Changes] (June 2, 2017), http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-06/02/c_1121078962.htm (last visited
June. 14, 2018).
71. Zhang Jinping, Kuajing Shuju Zhuanyi de Guoji Guizhi Ji Zhongguo Fali de Yingdui
(
MiAMS r8Z) [International Regulation of Cross-Border Data
Flows and China's Legal Countermeasure], 12 POLITICS & LAw 136, (2016) (China).
72. See id.
73. Zhonglun Cybersecurity Law Interpretation, supra note 11.
74. Id.
(#

AM

9t
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information.75 Within such context, the US generally favors free flow of
information and opposes the imposition of cross-border transfer
restrictions.76 Against such background, there are few express restrictions on
storing personal data outside the US, but some states have restrictions on
data access, maintenance, and processing from outside the US with respect
to government contracts and offshore outsourcing situations.77 Some federal
agencies can also impose such restrictions in their contracts.78 Otherwise, a
requirement to store personal data in the US usually manifests as a
contractual requirement where a customer is apprehensive about sensitive
data being stored in jurisdictions which are perceived as having a weak
personal data protection regime.79
impact on foreign investment in China: When evaluating a Chinese target,

foreign investors may consider conducting due diligence on applicability of
any Chinese data localization and cross-border transfer restrictions. To the
extent the target is subject to any such requirements, a foreign investor can
factor any cost required for compliance (e.g., ongoing cost that may be
required to maintain a separate data server in China) into the purchase price
and ongoing business plans.
Within the international dispute resolution context, foreign investors may
wish to engage an e-discovery specialist at the earliest stage to analyze the
feasibility and timing required to transfer any evidence stored in China.8o
Having said that, as certain Chinese requirements may not be entirely clear,
whether to transfer certain data outside of China or not might eventually be
a balancing test as to the actual non-compliance risk.81 On the other hand,
absent any negative legal inferences against the party which fails to provide
the requested data, any cross-border transfer restriction might work to a
party's benefit (e.g., serving as a justified defense in not submitting certain
data to the dispute resolution tribunal).82
IV.

Restrictions on Collecting and Using "Personal Data"

The Cybersecurity Law does not substantially change the existing Chinese
legal regime with respect to the collection and use of "personal data" in
(

75. Cheng Weidong, Kuajing Shuju Liudong de Fald 7ianguan

[Legal Supervision over Transborder Data How], EcON. & LEGAL JR., 71 (1998) (China).
76. Id.
77. leuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: Overview, LOEB & LOEB (July 1, 2017), at
issue 21, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/6-502-0467?transitionType=default&con
textData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 (last visited June 14, 2018).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Christian Zeunert & David Rosenthal, Cross-BorderDiscovery PracticalConsiderationsAND
Solutions for Multinational, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 145, 147 (2011).
81. Akerman et al., supra note 55, at 393 (discussing cross-border transfer restrictions will
make US judges and private enterprises do a balancing test of required discovery materials).
82. Id. at 394 (discussing the cross-border transfer requirements can work both ways,
sometimes can harm but sometimes may be helpful).
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China.83 The key to ensure compliance is obtaining users' consent regarding
any collection, use, or other disposal of any personal data. But among
others, the Cybersecurity Law does introduce two new interesting
requirements, as discussed below.
Security breach notification law: Before issuance of the Cybersecurity Law,

there was no nationwide requirement for notifying data subjects of a data
security breach (such requirement might be available in certain local
districts, e.g., in Shanghai).84 The Cybersecurity Law makes such security
breach notification a nationwide obligation. Considering the substantial
cost that might be incurred for compliance, commentators opine that such
obligation will serve as a deterrent such that network operators will carefully
safeguard the data to avoid any notification.85 In a recent case, Uber failed
to notify around fifty-seven million users about Uber's information leakage
incident, resulting in a governmental investigation.86 Uber's case shows the
potential vast liability and cost associated with a security breach notification.
As of April 2017, forty-eight of the United States, as well as the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands have all enacted laws
requiring notification of security breaches involving personal data.87
Alabama and South Dakota are the only states without a security breach
law."
The Cybersecurity Law requires "timely" notification to data subjects, but
what this means remains to be clarified. In comparison, the typical standard
in the US (set out under various state laws) is notification to data subjects
within thirty days without unreasonable delay.89
Right to be forgotten: The right to be forgotten (which took root in the EU)
is newly enacted under PRC laws,90 overruling an earlier 2016 Beijing case
which held that there is no right to be forgotten under Chinese laws.

83. Zhonglun Cybersecurity Law Interpretation, supra note 11.
84. Dong Xiao, Data Protection in China: Overview (Oct. 1, 2016), https://uk.practicallaw.
thomsonreuters.com/Document/102064faf1cb611e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html?
transitionType=CategoryPageltem&contextData=(Sc.Default)&navld=C080EB67FA2DOCD
59B42E2952FF3ED01&comp=pluk (last updated Oct. 1, 2016; last visited Nov. 29, 2017).
85. Li Ling, Wangluoanquan Fa Caoan Yinru Shanchuquan He Shuju Xielou Tongzhi Zhidu
(RM
)
1MASW10U W
RI~fiiL ) [Right to be Forgotten and Security Breach
Notification Requirement Introduced under Draft Cybersecurity Law] (July 31, 2015), http://
zqb.cyol.com/html/2015-07/3 1/nw.D1 10000zgqnb_201507313-03.htm (Last Visited June 14,
2018) (China).
86. Stephanie Forshee & Jennifer Williams-Alvarez, Uber In-House Attorney Out Behind
Massive Cyberattack That Went Undisclosed, 258 N.Y. L.J. 2 (Nov. 21, 2017).
87. Jolly, supra note 77, at issue 14.
88. Id.
89. Ackerman et al., supra note 55, at 410k, Joanna, David, 2016 Cross-Border Panel
Discussion, supra note 55, at 410.
90. See Ling, supra note 85.
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In that case, Chinese courts in Beijing ruled in favor of Baidu in a lawsuit
over removing search results of Ren Jiayu.91 It was the first of such cases to
be heard in Chinese courts. 92 In the suit, Ren Jiayu sued the Chinese search
engine Baidu over search results that associated him with a previous
employer.93 The courts ruled against Ren, and held, among other things,
that there is no "right of forgotten" enacted under PRC laws so no relief can
be granted.94
This case shows how the new right to be forgotten may potentially affect
court rulings and create potential costs for network operators in satisfying
requests from individual users to delete their personal data.
In comparison, data subjects in the US currently have no right to request
the deletion of their data under applicable federal laws.95 Under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), an individual can
request inaccurate or incomplete information be amended.96 But the entity
covered under HIPAA is not required to amend the data.97 As for state laws,
the California Online Privacy Protection Act requires operators of web sites,
online services, and mobile apps that are directed to minors-or that have
actual knowledge that a minor is using their site or service-to permit a
minor (as a registered user) to remove or request the removal of certain
online information that she/he posted.98 The law does not apply to content
for which the minor "received compensation or other consideration."99
Impact on foreign investment in China: A potential foreign investor should

review existing business practice in China against compliance and factor any
cost required for ongoing compliance into the purchase price and future
business plans.
V.

National Cybersecurity Review

Under the Cybersecurity Law, if the purchase by CII operators of network
products and services may affect national security, CII operators should
complete national cybersecurity review organized by Chinese governments
91. Nathan Jubb, Chinese Have No Right to be Forgotten, Court Rules, SIXTH TONE (Sept. 29,
2018), at http://www.sixthtone.com/news/814/chinese-have-no-right-be-forgotten-court-rules.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Ren ]iayu Yu Beijing Baidu Wangxun Keji Youxian Gongsi Mingyuquan ]iufen Ershen Minshi
tPL3f
JJV)[Ren
Jiayu v.
Panjueshu (
ILiI
Bejing Baidu Wangxun Technology Ltd.], 2015 Beijing Interm. People's Ct. Dec. 25, 2015,
(available at http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/content/content?DoclD=789e76ed-c084-41bb-8e75a092cba58912) (China).
95. Jolly, supra note 77, at issue 14.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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(essentially a supply-chain review).100 It is expected that the applicable
industry regulators will further issue catalogs to identify the specific vendor
products and services subject to the cybersecurity review.O1

The available security review requirements and the structure of the
proposed review authority are general brush strokes and remain to be
further clarified (e.g., how to review early manufacturing and/or testing
stages of the vendor products, whether foreign shareholding background of
the vendors should be considered, etc.).102
Foreign companies have raised concerns that the national cybersecurity
review process is a disguise of local protectionism (i.e., to screen out foreign
products and services).103 The CAC spokesman countered that the review

does not target to exclude or discriminate against products or services from
particular regions and is not intended to restrict the Chinese market from
foreign products or services.104 According to the spokesman, the goal for

implementing the cybersecurity review is to boost consumer confidence and
increase market potentials for all businesses.10
In the US, security review on supply-chain is not uncommon when the
utilization of cyber products or services has national security implications.
For example, in November 2013, the Department of Defense issued interim
rules requiring supply-chain review with respect to procurements related to
national security systems ("NSS").106 Information systems need not be used
or operated by a government agency in order to qualify as NSS's.107 There

(

100. Cybersecurity Law, supra note 23, art. 35; see Wangluo Chanpin He Fuwu Anquan Shencha
Banfa (I
l
[Measures on Security Review of Network Products and
Services (Trial for Implementation)] (promulgated by Cyberspace Admin., May 2017, effective
June 1, 2017) (China), art. 2 [hereinafter National Cybersecurity Review Measures]; see also
Mark Wang & Ron Cai, The Chinese Government Issues Draft Cybersecurity Regulations to Protect
CriticalInformation Infrastructure,22 No. 8 CYBERSPACE LAWYER NL 6, 6 (2017) (discussing the
cybersecurity review for vendors of CII).
101. National Cybersecurity Review Measures, supra note 100, art. 10.
102. Dong Xiao, Wangxinban Chutai Shoubu Wangluoanquan Fa Shishi Banfa Wangluo Chanpin
(f&
)
He Fuwu Anquan Shencha Banfa (gH
) [CAC Adopted First CSL Ancillary Measures for Network Products and
Services Security Review] JUNHE (May 19, 2017), http://www.junhe.com/law-reviews/634 (last
visited June 14, 2018).
103. Chen Hongyan, Wangluoanguan Fa Bushi Ziyou Maoyi de Bilei ((
Z
)
Eh
ff_
[Cybersecurity Law Does Not Indicate Obstruction to Free Trading] SoHu (Sep.
15, 2017) (China), http://www.sohu.com/a/192151421_488440 (last visited June 14, 2018).
104. See Hang, supra note 9.
105. Id.

9@V)

(

106. Meiguo Shi Ruhe jinxing Wangluoanquan Shencha de

[How US Conducts Its Cybersecurity Review], XINHUA (May 22, 2014) (China), http://
www.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-05/22/c_1110810913.htm
(last visited June 14, 2018)
[hereinafter US Cybersecurity Review Guide].
107. Stewart A. Baker, Thomas P. Barletta, Marc Frey, Edward J. Krauland, DoD Publishes
Interim Rule on Supply Chain Security for Defense Contractors, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (Dec. 3,
2013), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=D46db237-le55-498f-ba4f466d0ff9341a (last visited June 14, 2018).
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are also similar supply-chain security review requirements for cloud service
providers under the Federal Risk and Authorization Management
Program.108
Comparison with Foreign Investment National Security Review: The Chinese

foreign investment national security review (Chinese counterpart of the US
CFIUS review) is separate and different from the cybersecurity review
discussed above.
The foreign investment review is a mandatory process applying to foreign
investment (taking control) in Chinese companies that has national security
implications.109 National security implications can generally be indicated by
foreign investment into sensitive industries (e.g., military products, critical
infrastructure, etc.), or foreign investment into enterprises located nearby
major and sensitive military facilities.io Control does not necessarily refer
to possessing more than fifty percent shareholding interests in the target
Chinese company, and can cover any scenario where a foreign investor
controls the business, decision-making, financial, or technology of a China
target.111
A special committee consisting of representatives of various Chinese
governments (commerce departments, reform and development
departments, etc.) organizes the foreign investment review.112 Upon review,
if the special committee deems that a transaction may impact PRC national
security, the committee has blocking rights or can order divestiture of
particular assets even after a transaction is closed."1
108. See US Cybersecurity Review Guide, supra note 106.
109. See e.g. Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Yinfa Ziyoumaoyi Shlyanqu Waishang Touzi Guojia

Anquan Shencha Shixing Banfa de Tongzhi (M1
iI
[Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Issuing the
Measures for the Pilot Program of National Security Review of Foreign Investment in Pilot
Free Trade Zones] (promulgated by St. Council Office, Apr. 8, 2015, effective May 8, 2015), art.
1 (China), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-04/20/content_9629.htm
(last visited
June 14, 2018) [hereinafter FTZ Foreign Investment Security Review Guide]; also see
Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Jianli Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou ]ingnei Qive Anquan Shencha
Zhidu de Tongzhi
[Notice of the General Office of the State Council on the Establishment of the Security Review
System for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors]
(promulgated by St. Council Office, Feb. 3, 2011, effective Mar. 3, 2011), art. 1 (China), http://
www.jonesday.com/files/upload/PRC`%20State%20Council%2ONSR%20Notice.pdf
(last
visited June 14, 2018) [hereinafter General Foreign Investment Security Review Guide].

110. See FTZ Foreign Investment Security Review Guide, supra note 109; also see General
Foreign Investment Security Review Guide, supra note 109.
111. See FTZ Foreign Investment Security Review Guide, supra note 109; also see General
Foreign Investment Security Review Guide, supra note 109.
112. FTZ Foreign
Foreign Investment
113. FTZ Foreign
Foreign Investment

Investment Security Review Guide, supra note 109, arts. 2-3; General
Security Review Guide, supra note 109, art. 3.
Investment Security Review Guide, supra note 109, arts. 3-6; General
Security Review Guide, supra note 109, arts. 4-6.
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Impact on foreign investment in China: Be aware that there are two types of

different PRC national security review. Factor any applicable security
review requirements into project timelines and ongoing business plans.
VI.

Penalty for Violation of the Cybersecurity Law"14

Administrative penalties: Generally speaking, violation of the requirements
set out under the Cybersecurity Law may subject an entity to administrative
fines of up to USD $75,777, an order from the competent regulatory
authority to cease business operation, possible confiscation of all illegally
earned income, shut down of the relevant website, and/or revocation of the
relevant business permit/license of the network operator, and a fine of up to
RMB 100,000 (around USD $15,155) can be imposed on the directly
responsible person in charge* and other liable persons** of the CII
operator.115
Civil right of action: Any violation of the Cybersecurity Law by a network
operator entitles a private right of action against such network operator for
civil liabilities.116
Criminal liabilities: Violation of the Cybersecurity Law and certain of its
implementation rules could warrant criminal liability for "failure to comply
with cybersecurity management obligations" and "infringement on Chinese
citizens' personal data"."1
In either of such cases, an entity deemed to
commit such a crime will be imposed with fines, and its directly responsible
person in charge* and other directly liable persons** could be punished with
life sentences.
*"Directly responsible person in charge refers to individuals who
decides, approves, directs, or allows the violation by an entity, and
normally includes the chief responsible person of an entity (including
the legal representative of the entity).
**Other directly liable persons refer to individuals who implements the
actual violation of an entity and plays significant role within the process.
Such persons can include managers and employees of an entity.""1s
114. RMB:USD calculated based on an exchange rate of 1 USD: 6.59830819 RMB, applicable
as of November 26, 2017.
115. See, e.g., Cybersecurity Law, supra note 23, art. 66.
116. Id. art. 74.
117. Zhonglun Cybersecurity Law Interpretation, supra note 11; see Dong Xiao, Liang Gao

jieshi Dailai Qiye Xinxi Hegui de Xintiaozhan (M' M A+7WL)

[New

Interpretation From SPC And SPP Provides New Compliance Challenges For Enterprises]
JUNHE, (May 26, 2017), http://www.junhe.com/law-reviews/638 (last visited June 14, 2018).
118. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yinfa Quanguo Fayuan Shenli inrong Fanzui Anjian Gongzuo
Zuotanhui
de Tongzhi (B
'yao
l
7MA) [Notice of the Supreme People's Court of the PRC with respect to Nationwide
Courts' Review of Financial Criminal Cases] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Jan. 21,
2001, effective Jan. 21, 2001), art. 2-1-2 (China), available at https://baike.baidu.com/item/
I
E (last visited June 14, 2018).
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"Legal representative" is a position that each company incorporated in
China is required to have under PRC laws. A legal representative can
generally take actions on behalf of a company which binds such company.
Considering the potential personal liability of a legal representative in
criminal violation context, foreign investors are suggested to carefully
choose a legal representative candidate while balancing control over a China
subsidiary.
VII.

Conclusion

Traditionally, when a foreign investor evaluates a potential investment in
China, Chinese cybersecurity and data protection requirements is not an
area for due diligence. But with the issuance of the Cybersecurity Law and
its implementation rules, the various requirements set out under such rules
may impact the business and legal assumptions that foreign investors make
regarding Chinese inbound investments.
As such, foreign investors may wish to review the Chinese cybersecurity
legal regime as part of their due diligence and factor any identified issues
into the purchase price, project timeline, and ongoing business models (as
applicable). A foreign investor may also wish to engage a cross-border ediscovery expert at the earliest stage to coordinate global efforts in any
international dispute resolution proceeding.
Eventually, it may boil down to a risk-based decision, as there may be
some nuance in complying with every country's laws and requirements
(considering certain laws and regulations are themselves not clear and
require judgments on compliance) while satisfying interests of each
stakeholder within the corporate structure.11 9 Similarly, a legal counsel may
need to provide a thought-through analysis weighing the risks of different
factors (taking into account the relevant enforcement practice) to enable a
corporate decision-maker to decide the proper way forward.120

119. Ackerman et al., supra note 55, at 392 (discussing [a party is] never going to be able to
comply with every country's laws . . . and . . . make shareholders happy, and do all of those

things that companies want to do).
120. Id. at 393.
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